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GUNS,	  BUTTER,	  LEON	  KEYSERLING,	  THE	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  AND	  THE	  FATE	  OF	  
FULLEMPLOYMENT	  ECONOMICS	  
	  EDMUND	  F.	  WEHRLE	  	  On	  15	  January	  1954,	  an	  intriguing	  proposal	  landed	  on	  the	  desks	  of	  both	  CIO	  President	  Walter	  Reuther	  and	  AFL	  President	  George	  Meany.	  Its	  author	  was	  Leon	  Keyserling,	  a	  former	  chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisors	  and	  a	  longtime	  friend	  of	  organized	  labor.	  The	  ebullient,	  outspoken	  economist	  called	  upon	  the	  two	  union	  leaders	  to	  rededicate	  themselves	  to	  a	  bold	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  vision	  of	  full-­‐employment	  economics.	  Massive	  government	  investment,	  he	  assured	  the	  labor	  barons,	  could	  generate	  new	  levels	  of	  growth—producing	  a	  $500	  billiona-­‐year	  economy	  and	  eliminating	  poverty.	  Roused	  by	  Keyserling,	  the	  CIO	  and	  the	  AFL	  jointly	  sponsored	  a	  private	  think-­‐tank,	  the	  Conference	  on	  Economic	  Progress,	  headed	  by	  Keyserling.	  Over	  the	  next	  two	  and	  a	  half	  decades,	  the	  economist	  profoundly	  shaped	  organized	  labor’s	  approach	  to	  economic	  policy,	  and	  through	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  Keyserling	  continued	  to	  influence	  the	  national	  debate.	  	  Boldly	  pursuing	  his	  agenda,	  he	  increasingly	  turned	  to	  defense	  spending	  for	  the	  fiscal	  fuel	  to	  fire	  economic	  growth.	  By	  the	  early	  1970s,	  however,	  divisions	  over	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  deeply	  divided	  liberals—leaving	  Keyserling	  and	  labor	  discredited	  and	  alienated	  from	  mainstream	  economic	  thought.	  	  Largely	  overlooked	  since	  his	  death	  in	  1987,	  Leon	  Keyserling’s	  legacy	  and	  ideas	  recently	  have	  experienced	  something	  of	  a	  revival	  among	  scholars,	  drawing	  the	  attention	  of	  historians	  such	  as	  Robert	  Brazelton	  and	  Robert	  Collins.	  Collins	  insightfully	  describes	  Keyserling’s	  contributions	  in	  his	  recent	  work	  More:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Economic	  Growth	  in	  Postwar	  America.1	  Neither	  Collins	  nor	  Brazelton,	  however,	  fully	  recognize	  Keyserling’s	  later	  influence	  on	  policy	  through	  his	  work	  with	  organized	  labor,	  nor	  the	  growing	  role	  played	  by	  defense	  spending	  in	  Keyserling’s	  formulations.	  	  Leaving	  government	  service	  in	  1953,	  Keyserling	  continued	  to	  advocate	  an	  extreme	  brand	  of	  full-­‐employment	  economics.	  Particularly	  through	  his	  allies	  in	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  he	  tirelessly	  lobbied	  for	  increased	  federal	  spending	  to	  push	  growth	  and	  employment.	  The	  vicissitudes	  visited	  on	  Keyserling-­‐style	  full-­‐employment	  economics	  between	  the	  1950s	  and	  1970s	  reveal	  much	  about	  the	  changing	  economic	  temper	  of	  the	  times.	  Perhaps	  his	  most	  profound	  impact—which	  would	  eventually	  serve	  as	  the	  undoing	  of	  full-­‐employment	  economics—was	  the	  promotion	  of	  defense	  spending	  as	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  his	  program.	  Never	  fully	  able	  to	  convince	  even	  liberals	  to	  adopt	  his	  uncompromising	  faith	  in	  growth	  through	  federal	  spending,	  both	  Keyserling	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  turned	  increasingly	  to	  the	  military-­‐industrial-­‐complex	  to	  meet	  the	  spending	  levels	  they	  prescribed—and	  turned	  increasingly	  to	  Cold	  War	  rhetoric	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  such	  spending.	  Yet	  by	  the	  1970s,	  the	  unpopularity	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  growing	  distrust	  of	  government	  in	  general	  doomed	  full-­‐employment	  economics,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  a	  new	  conservative	  approach	  rejecting	  fiscal	  spending	  as	  a	  drag	  on	  the	  economy.	  
While	  the	  antithesis	  of	  Keyserling’s	  ideals,	  this	  new	  line	  of	  attack	  shared	  his	  self-­‐assurance	  and	  faith	  in	  growth	  as	  the	  panacea	  for	  all	  economic	  and	  societal	  ills.	  	  	  	  From	  the	  onset	  of	  his	  career,	  Keyserling	  established	  himself	  as	  something	  of	  an	  outsider	  from	  the	  academically-­‐orientated	  world	  of	  most	  economists.	  A	  native	  of	  South	  Carolina,	  he	  studied	  briefly	  under	  Rexford	  Tugwell	  and	  Richard	  T.	  Ely	  at	  Columbia	  University	  in	  the	  1920s.	  But	  Keyserling	  was	  clearly	  more	  interested	  in	  shaping	  policy	  than	  studying	  theory.	  He	  left	  New	  York	  City	  for	  Harvard	  University	  Law	  School	  and	  then	  was	  drawn	  to	  Washington,	  D.C.	  in	  1933	  by	  Tugwell	  to	  join	  the	  legions	  of	  young	  men	  likewise	  attracted	  to	  Roosevelt’s	  New	  Deal.2	  Eventually	  Keyserling	  found	  his	  way	  into	  the	  employ	  of	  Senator	  Robert	  Wagner	  of	  New	  York.	  From	  the	  Senate,	  Keyserling	  helped	  prepare	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  legislation	  of	  the	  New	  Deal,	  including	  the	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Act	  (Wagner	  Act)	  and	  the	  Social	  Security	  Act.3	  In	  Washington,	  Keyserling	  became	  deeply	  impressed	  by	  proto-­‐Keynesian	  theories	  increasingly	  popular	  with	  trade	  unionists	  and	  some	  progressive	  businessmen.	  	  He	  later	  described	  the	  early	  economic	  outlook	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  as	  a	  “raw	  Keynesianism,”	  but	  one	  that	  “didn’t	  come	  from	  Keynes.”4	  By	  the	  late	  1930s,	  then	  serving	  as	  deputy	  and	  later	  acting	  administrator	  of	  the	  Housing	  Authority,	  Keyserling	  became	  a	  major	  advocate	  of	  what	  by	  then	  was	  known	  as	  fullemployment	  economics—harnessing	  government	  spending	  to	  foster	  employment	  by	  creating	  demand	  and	  promoting	  consumer	  spending.	  Alongside	  trade	  union	  leader	  Sidney	  Hillman	  and	  economist	  Alvin	  Hanson,	  Keyserling	  became	  a	  leading	  spokesperson	  for	  full-­‐employment	  economics	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  While	  CIO	  figures	  such	  as	  Hillman	  had	  been	  early	  supporters	  of	  the	  economic	  approach,	  by	  the	  1940s,	  the	  supposedly	  more	  conservative	  AFL	  also	  embraced	  full-­‐employment	  economics.	  In	  fact,	  given	  the	  federation’s	  traditional	  distrust	  of	  government	  and	  discomfort	  with	  some	  New	  Deal	  controls,	  full	  employment	  was	  an	  ideal	  fit	  for	  the	  AFL’s	  ambivalent	  view	  of	  the	  state;	  it	  provided	  a	  defined	  and	  confined	  mission	  for	  the	  federal	  government,	  leaving	  collective	  bargaining	  largely	  in	  the	  independent	  hands	  of	  employers	  and	  labor.	  Throughout	  the	  war,	  the	  AFL’s	  mouthpiece,	  The	  American	  Federationist,	  ran	  article	  after	  article	  extolling	  the	  virtues	  of	  fullemployment	  economics.	  Contributors	  included	  Keyserling,	  businessman	  Paul	  Hoffman,	  and	  government	  planner	  John	  H.	  G.	  Pierson.5	  Although	  labor	  historians	  generally	  associate	  the	  CIO	  with	  full-­‐employment	  economics,	  in	  its	  outspoken	  support,	  the	  AFL	  often	  outdid	  its	  supposedly	  more	  progressive	  counterpart.	  	  	  	  The	  postwar	  years	  should	  have	  been	  the	  apogee	  of	  the	  full-­‐employment	  movement.	  Keyserling	  helped	  author	  the	  Employment	  Act	  of	  1946,	  which,	  although	  heavily	  compromised	  from	  its	  original	  form,	  articulated	  and	  encoded	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  full-­‐employment	  economics.6	  The	  resurgence	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party	  in	  the	  1946	  elections	  and	  general	  New	  Deal-­‐fatigue,	  however,	  threw	  up	  significant	  obstacles.	  Now	  working	  directly	  for	  the	  White	  House	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisors	  (a	  body	  created	  by	  the	  Employment	  Act),	  Keyserling	  grew	  increasingly	  frustrated	  as	  political	  gridlock	  sidelined	  Truman’s	  Fair	  Deal	  initiatives	  even	  after	  the	  Democrats	  retook	  control	  of	  Congress	  in	  1949.	  	  Appointed	  as	  chair	  of	  
the	  CEA	  that	  year,	  Keyserling	  searched	  frantically	  for	  ways	  to	  reinvigorate	  the	  full-­‐employment	  agenda.	  	  Whilst	  fiscal	  support	  may	  have	  been	  lacking	  for	  domestic	  initiatives,	  the	  Cold	  War	  created	  new	  mandates	  for	  spending.	  Unable	  to	  find	  a	  receptive	  audience	  for	  social	  spending,	  Keyserling	  found	  the	  military	  infinitely	  more	  interested.	  He	  began	  sitting	  in	  on	  National	  Security	  Council	  meetings	  and	  lobbying	  for	  increased	  defense	  spending,	  eventually	  helping	  to	  mold	  the	  economics	  undergirding	  the	  NSC-­‐68	  plan	  for	  expanding	  American	  military	  capacity	  approved	  in	  early	  1950.7	  The	  advent	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  then	  provided	  just	  the	  spark	  to	  further	  expand	  defense	  appropriations	  spending	  warmly	  endorsed	  by	  Keyserling,	  now	  chairman	  of	  the	  CEA.	  During	  the	  war,	  unemployment	  quickly	  sank	  to	  below	  4	  percent,	  essentially	  full	  employment.	  	  On	  the	  surface,	  it	  appeared	  Keyserling	  had	  morphed	  seamlessly	  from	  social	  Keynesianism	  to	  military	  Keynesianism.8	  But	  Keyserling	  and	  many	  in	  organized	  labor	  hoped	  to	  directly	  appropriate	  defense	  spending	  to	  address	  social	  needs—	  including	  the	  problem	  of	  lingering	  pockets	  of	  unemployment.	  Acquiescing	  to	  organized	  labor’s	  demands	  that	  it	  be	  included	  in	  mobilization	  policy-­‐making,	  Truman	  appointed	  labor	  leaders	  and	  full-­‐employment-­‐minded	  liberals	  to	  dozens	  of	  key	  planning	  agencies.	  Together	  these	  individuals	  worked	  tirelessly	  to	  formulate	  programs	  to	  aid	  economically	  distressed	  industries	  and	  regions.	  Pressure	  from	  the	  National	  Production	  Agency’s	  labor	  office	  resulted,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  issuance	  of	  Defense	  Manpower	  Policy	  Number	  4	  (DMP#4)	  on	  7	  February	  1952.	  The	  policy	  directed	  that	  special	  consideration	  be	  given	  to	  regions	  officially	  designated	  “labor	  surplus	  areas,”	  i.e.,	  regions	  with	  unemployment	  rates	  of	  6	  percent	  or	  more.9	  DMP#4	  and	  the	  entire	  Korean	  War	  experience,	  in	  which	  employment	  levels	  soared,	  deeply	  gratifying	  Keyserling,	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  close,	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  defense	  and	  full-­‐employment	  economics.	  An	  avowed	  cold	  warrior,	  Keyserling	  felt	  no	  qualms	  about	  this	  growing	  relationship,	  but	  it	  would	  later	  return	  to	  haunt	  him.	  	  By	  the	  last	  months	  of	  the	  war,	  however,	  Keyserling	  and	  labor	  liberals	  found	  themselves	  suddenly	  divorced	  from	  the	  seat	  of	  power	  after	  two	  decades.	  The	  Eisenhower	  administration	  promised	  to	  be	  much	  less	  welcoming	  to	  fullemployment	  economics.	  Campaigning	  in	  1952,	  Eisenhower	  told	  an	  Illinois	  audience:	  “My	  goal,	  assuring	  the	  cold	  war	  gets	  no	  worse,	  is	  to	  cut	  federal	  spending	  to	  something	  like	  $60	  billion	  within	  four	  years.”10	  In	  office,	  Eisenhower’s	  major	  fiscal	  goals,	  centered	  on	  curbing	  inflation	  and	  balancing	  the	  budget,	  placed	  him	  well	  out	  of	  step	  with	  full-­‐employment	  economics	  advocates	  like	  Keyserling.11	  	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  of	  growing	  frustration	  that	  Keyserling	  approached	  organized	  labor	  with	  his	  proposal	  to	  revitalize	  and	  update	  the	  full-­‐employment	  agenda.	  In	  his	  offer	  to	  the	  AFL	  and	  CIO	  leadership,	  Keyserling	  boldly	  called	  for	  a	  massive	  push	  toward	  full-­‐employment	  goals.	  He	  claimed	  that	  through	  an	  immense	  program	  of	  government-­‐sponsored	  pump-­‐priming,	  the	  annual	  rate	  of	  	  
growth	  could	  be	  more	  than	  doubled.	  Such	  a	  program,	  Keyserling	  insisted,	  would	  greatly	  stimulate	  production	  and	  lift	  millions	  of	  economically	  marginal	  Americans	  into	  new	  realms	  of	  security.	  Instead	  of	  emphasizing	  minimum	  wages,	  Keyserling	  set	  a	  goal	  of	  adding	  several	  thousand	  dollars	  to	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  average	  family,	  while	  improving	  outlays	  for	  education,	  social	  security,	  health,	  and	  resource	  management.	  Not	  content	  to	  stop	  at	  home,	  Keyserling	  also	  proposed	  generous	  aid	  packages	  and	  military	  assistance	  to	  developing	  countries.	  Any	  and	  all	  spending	  was	  to	  be	  applauded.	  Spending,	  even	  if	  it	  created	  temporary	  deficits,	  produced	  jobs	  and	  increased	  production.	  Everything	  was	  within	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  American	  economy:	  full	  employment,	  a	  $500	  billion-­‐a-­‐year	  economy,	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  poverty.	  	  Keyserling’s	  plan	  brazenly	  dismissed	  all	  limits.	  There	  need	  be	  no	  necessary	  business	  cycle;	  inflation	  was	  not	  to	  be	  feared;	  nor	  was	  there	  to	  be	  concern	  about	  waste	  or	  inefficiency.	  To	  most	  economists,	  such	  assurances	  of	  painless	  growth	  appeared	  Panglossian,	  and	  even	  dangerous.	  But	  in	  its	  bold	  confidence,	  Keyserling’s	  plan	  did	  have	  its	  appeal.	  It	  also	  embodied	  a	  strong	  current	  of	  social	  conscience,	  aimed	  as	  it	  was	  at	  elevating	  the	  incomes	  and	  improving	  the	  lifestyles	  of	  all	  Americans.	  	  For	  Keyserling,	  reinvigorating	  full-­‐employment	  economics	  would	  take	  more	  than	  just	  economic	  theorizing.	  It	  would	  also	  require	  effectively	  marketing	  the	  plan	  to	  the	  general	  public.	  His	  memo	  to	  Meany	  and	  Reuther	  stressed	  public	  relations	  as	  essential	  to	  furthering	  the	  growth	  agenda.	  He	  cautioned	  that	  scaremongering	  about	  a	  coming	  depression	  would	  no	  longer	  work.	  New	  ideas	  had	  to	  be	  presented	  in	  “modern	  and	  popular	  terms.	  .	  .	  .	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  an	  affirmative	  prosperity	  approach,	  sound	  yet	  vital,	  practical	  yet	  inspirational.”	  The	  current	  liberal	  approach,	  formulated	  during	  the	  New	  Deal	  and	  war	  years,	  was	  “out	  of	  date	  and	  consequently	  inadequate	  and	  uninspiring.”	  A	  new	  approach	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  political	  climate.	  In	  the	  current	  atmosphere	  of	  anticommunism,	  Keyserling	  warned,	  New	  Deal-­‐style	  plans	  to	  expand	  social	  welfare	  programs	  would	  be	  labeled	  “socialistic”	  or	  even	  “communistic.”	  Keyserling	  proposed	  to	  market	  his	  plan	  as	  a	  middle	  way	  that	  would	  “steer	  between	  the	  extreme	  of	  donothing	  government,	  and	  the	  opposite	  extreme	  of	  the	  belief	  in	  some	  quarters	  that	  only	  government	  can	  promote	  stability	  and	  growth.”	  The	  plan	  would	  stress	  growth	  within	  the	  free	  enterprise	  system	  “through	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  wage,	  collective	  bargaining	  and	  price-­‐profit-­‐investment	  policies.”12	  Keyserling’s	  goals	  naturally	  found	  a	  sympathetic	  hearing	  at	  both	  the	  AFL	  and	  CIO,	  where	  the	  new	  leadership	  of	  both	  federations	  was	  eager	  to	  update	  approaches	  to	  economics	  and	  politics.	  Both	  Reuther	  and	  Meany	  signed	  on	  as	  the	  key	  financial	  sponsors	  of	  Keyserling’s	  proposed	  think	  tank,	  the	  Conference	  on	  Economic	  Progress.	  It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  for	  Keyserling	  to	  seize	  upon	  Cold	  War	  rhetoric	  as	  part	  of	  his	  campaign	  to	  freshen	  and	  modernize	  the	  discourse	  of	  full-­‐employment	  economics.	  	  Although	  not	  mentioned	  specifically	  in	  his	  memo	  to	  Meany	  and	  Reuther,	  defense	  spending	  remained	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  Keyserling’s	  plan.	  In	  many	  ways,	  military	  dollars	  became	  the	  default	  source	  of	  revenue	  to	  finance	  Keyserling’s	  
full-­‐employment	  drive.	  The	  Conference	  on	  Economic	  Progress,	  in	  its	  first	  report	  produced	  by	  Keyserling	  in	  1954,	  strongly	  urged	  higher	  military	  expenditures	  to	  meet	  “gaps	  in	  our	  defense”	  programs.	  This	  was	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  proposed	  $3	  billion	  increase	  in	  spending	  to	  go	  along	  with	  a	  $4.5	  billion	  tax	  cut	  for	  lower	  income	  Americans.13Writing	  in	  The	  New	  Republic,	  Keyserling	  insisted	  that	  “[w]e	  most	  assuredly	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  assume	  whatever	  tasks	  may	  be	  indicated	  by	  the	  perils—or	  the	  promise—of	  the	  atomic	  age.”14	  The	  AFL	  and	  CIO	  quickly	  picked	  up	  Keyserling’s	  line.	  Meany	  aide	  George	  Brown	  argued	  that	  in	  light	  of	  the	  “uneasy	  truce	  in	  Korea	  and	  Indochina”	  there	  was	  more	  than	  enough	  reason	  for	  “the	  U.S.	  to	  maintain	  a	  strong	  military	  defense	  program.”15	  Likewise,	  CIO	  representatives,	  in	  testimony	  to	  Congress,	  warned	  of	  “rumblings	  in	  Indo-­‐China,”	  and	  asserted,	  “We	  must	  continue	  the	  military	  buildup	  that	  we	  began.”16	  	  In	  Keyserling’s	  vision,	  the	  labor	  movement	  found	  an	  alluring	  agenda	  for	  the	  1950s,	  one	  stressing	  the	  potential	  for	  infinite	  growth	  and	  social	  uplift.	  While	  liberals,	  such	  as	  economist	  John	  Kenneth	  Galbraith,	  found	  Keyserling’s	  faith	  in	  growth	  naïve,	  organized	  labor	  discovered	  an	  economic	  creed	  to	  buttress	  its	  calls	  for	  increased	  social	  spending,	  full	  employment,	  and	  (sharing	  Keyserling’s	  anticommunism)expansion	  abroad.17	  In	  addition,	  the	  joint	  AFL	  and	  CIO	  support	  for	  Keyserling’s	  work	  offered	  an	  arena	  for	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two	  formerly	  bitter	  rivals,	  foreshadowing	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  merger	  roughly	  a	  year	  later.	  	  	  	  Labor	  unity,	  however,	  could	  not	  mask	  deep	  disaffection	  with	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  continuing	  fiscal	  parsimony.	  In	  a	  full-­‐employment	  economy,	  Keyserling	  insisted	  in	  1956,	  wages	  should	  have	  risen	  almost	  5	  percent	  more	  than	  under	  the	  current	  regime.	  He	  bitterly	  lamented	  Eisenhower’s	  lack	  of	  “perception	  and	  originality,	  courage	  and	  vigor	  in	  building	  further	  upon	  the	  gains	  of	  the	  past.	  .	  .	  .	  [T]he	  machine	  needs	  some	  new	  fuel.”18	  Again,	  Keyserling	  countered	  by	  conjuring	  up	  Cold	  War	  rhetoric.	  “[E]conomic	  expansion,”	  wrote	  Keyserling	  in	  The	  New	  Republic,	  “is	  neither	  steady	  enough	  nor	  rapid	  enough	  in	  view	  of	  the	  Soviet	  challenge.”19	  In	  fact,	  throughout	  the	  Eisenhower	  years,	  the	  economy	  grew	  at	  the	  meager	  (at	  least	  by	  Keyserling’s	  standards)	  rate	  of	  2.5	  percent	  a	  year,	  barely	  half	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  between	  1947	  and	  1952.20	  While	  Keyserling	  never	  tired	  of	  trumpeting	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  growth	  between	  1947	  and	  1952—the	  period	  during	  which	  he	  served	  on	  the	  CEA—he	  often	  glazed	  over	  the	  role	  of	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  hot	  war	  in	  Korea	  in	  fueling	  a	  strong	  economy	  in	  the	  early	  1950s.	  	  By	  1957	  the	  economy	  appeared	  poised	  to	  slip	  into	  the	  second	  recession	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  but	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  remained	  frustrated	  in	  all	  attempts	  to	  gain	  an	  audience	  for	  its	  full-­‐employment	  agenda.	  Opportunity,	  however,	  arrived	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1957,	  with	  the	  Soviet	  launch	  of	  the	  Sputnik	  spacecraft.	  The	  Communist	  feat	  immediately	  injected	  new	  life	  into	  Cold	  War	  competition—just	  at	  the	  point	  when	  the	  American	  economy	  slid	  into	  recession.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  dual	  national	  emergencies,	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  became	  increasingly	  outspoken	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  vigorous	  guns	  and	  butter	  (or	  guns	  as	  butter)	  approach	  to	  the	  recession.	  From	  his	  perch,	  
Keyserling	  warned	  of	  massive	  Soviet	  investments	  in	  industry	  and	  armaments.	  	  “They	  are	  ‘affording’	  what	  they	  think	  they	  need,”	  warned	  Keyserling,	  “while	  we	  think	  we	  ‘cannot	  afford’	  what	  we	  know	  we	  need.”21	  In	  February	  1958,	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Executive	  Council	  complained	  that	  America’s	  military	  superiority	  was	  clearly	  “slipping”	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  national	  economy	  was	  “declining.”	  	  Meanwhile	  “unemployment	  and	  idle	  factories	  and	  machines”	  are	  “robbing	  us	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars	  of	  potential	  production	  of	  military	  and	  civilian	  goods.”	  The	  administration,	  however,	  remained	  mired	  in	  “penny	  pinching	  and	  budgetbalancing.”	  In	  very	  Keyserling-­‐like	  language,	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  declared	  that	  “the	  time	  is	  now—not	  tomorrow—for	  a	  bold	  program	  to	  lift	  the	  economy	  out	  of	  its	  slump	  and	  national	  defense	  out	  of	  its	  dangerous	  lag.	  .	  .	  .	  Prosperity	  and	  strong	  national	  defense	  are	  both	  feasible.”22	  	  Eisenhower,	  while	  privately	  complaining	  of	  “Sputnik	  complexes,”	  met	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  half	  way	  by	  agreeing	  to	  raise	  defense	  expenditures	  roughly	  $1.1	  billion	  in	  1958.23	  Eisenhower’s	  new	  outlays,	  combined	  with	  new	  expenditures	  for	  a	  federal	  highway	  system	  and	  other	  spending,	  helped	  pull	  the	  country	  out	  of	  the	  recession,	  at	  least	  temporarily.	  The	  following	  year,	  in	  testimony	  before	  a	  congressional	  committee,	  Walter	  Reuther	  credited	  the	  increase	  in	  defense	  spending	  with	  generating	  the	  recovery.24	  Labor	  and	  other	  full-­‐employment-­‐minded	  liberals	  may	  have	  gleaned	  an	  important	  lesson	  from	  the	  fiscal	  events	  of	  1958.	  While	  unemployment	  alone	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  move	  the	  government	  to	  action,	  economic	  worries	  combined	  with	  national	  security	  concerns,	  such	  as	  those	  provided	  by	  Sputnik,	  forced	  the	  president’s	  hand.25	  	  After	  eight	  frustrating	  years	  of	  Eisenhower,	  Keyserling	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  eagerly	  looked	  forward	  to	  a	  Democrat	  in	  the	  White	  House.	  Still,	  in	  1960	  there	  were	  initial	  concerns	  about	  frontrunner	  John	  F.	  Kennedy—in	  particular	  JFK’s	  close	  relations	  with	  Harvard	  economist	  John	  Kenneth	  Galbraith.	  While	  considered	  a	  Keynesian,	  Galbraith	  had	  argued	  American	  workers	  enjoyed	  excessive	  prosperity	  and	  luxury	  as	  citizens	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “affluent	  society.”	  He	  advocated	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  policies	  aimed	  only	  at	  producing	  growth,	  toward	  programs	  designed	  to	  channel	  growth	  and	  improve	  quality	  of	  life.26	  To	  Keyserling,	  this	  was	  nonsense.	  Keyserling	  insisted	  that	  poverty	  and	  economic	  stagnation	  remained	  plagues	  and	  could	  only	  be	  addressed	  through	  “maximum	  economic	  growth,	  full	  employment,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  abundance	  rather	  than	  the	  rationing	  of	  scarcity.”	  By	  contrast,	  Keyserling	  argued	  that	  Galbraith	  relied	  excessively	  on	  centralized	  planning	  and	  government-­‐organized	  redistribution.27	  The	  two	  economists	  engaged	  in	  a	  running	  battle	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  over	  the	  definition	  and	  implications	  of	  full-­‐employment	  economics,	  a	  disputation	  historian	  Robert	  Collins	  brands	  the	  “quality	  verses	  quantity	  of	  growth”	  debate.	  Simply	  put,	  Keyserling	  (and	  organized	  labor)	  remained	  concerned	  about	  the	  abundance	  of	  poverty,	  while	  Galbraith	  and	  many	  liberals	  shifted	  their	  concerns	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  poverty	  of	  abundance	  question,	  or	  the	  belief	  that	  despite	  the	  great	  prosperity	  of	  the	  times,	  the	  quality	  of	  American	  life	  lagged	  behind	  its	  great	  material	  success.28	  In	  this	  debate	  too	  Keyserling	  often	  employed	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  
warning	  that	  while	  it	  “has	  become	  fashionable	  for	  liberals	  to	  say	  we	  should	  cut	  back	  on	  private	  consumption	  of	  luxuries,”	  Russian	  standards	  of	  living	  were	  improving	  due	  to	  a	  growing	  “industrial	  base.”29	  	  In	  1960,	  Keyserling’s	  quantity	  of	  growth	  position	  seemed	  to	  have	  the	  upper	  hand.	  With	  the	  economy	  in	  recession,	  voters	  and	  candidates	  focused	  primarily	  on	  reviving	  economic	  growth.30	  And	  Kennedy	  worked	  hard	  during	  the	  campaign	  of	  1960	  to	  assure	  Keyserling	  and	  labor	  of	  his	  basic	  commitment	  to	  principles	  of	  vigorous	  growth	  and	  full	  employment.	  In	  a	  late	  September	  1960	  meeting	  with	  George	  Meany,	  Kennedy	  pushed	  all	  the	  right	  buttons.	  He	  complained	  about	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration’s	  tendency	  to	  allow	  the	  “Budget	  Bureau,	  rather	  than	  our	  experts	  in	  national	  defense	  and	  foreign	  policy,	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  as	  to	  how	  much	  is	  spent	  on	  national	  defense.”31	  Keyserling,	  for	  his	  part,	  reassured	  labor	  that	  Kennedy	  had	  not	  “bought	  the	  line	  emanating	  from	  Harvard	  and	  MIT.”32	  	  As	  president,	  Kennedy	  delighted	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  by	  adopting	  Keyserlingstyle,	  full-­‐employment	  tactics	  in	  response	  to	  the	  recession.	  He	  sent	  Galbraith	  to	  India	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisors.	  As	  chairman	  of	  the	  CEA,	  Kennedy	  selected	  Walter	  Heller,	  who,	  while	  lacking	  Keyserling’s	  singlemindedness,	  vowed	  to	  “return	  to	  the	  spirit	  as	  well	  as	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  Employment	  Act	  of	  1946”	  and	  meet	  regularly	  with	  labor	  leaders.33	  Kennedy	  also	  revived	  military	  Keynesianism.	  After	  several	  years	  of	  neglect,	  the	  new	  president	  resuscitated	  Defense	  Manpower	  Policy	  #4.	  He	  instructed	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  S.	  McNamara	  to	  begin	  a	  vigorous	  program	  of	  directing	  defense	  contracts	  to	  labor	  surplus	  areas,	  a	  program	  he	  dubbed	  “Operation	  Booster.”34	  Labor	  applauded	  such	  developments	  and	  offered	  an	  unprecedented	  “no-­‐strike”	  pledge	  in	  the	  missile	  industry.35	  Within	  a	  month	  of	  Kennedy	  taking	  office,	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Executive	  Council	  proclaimed,	  “the	  new	  administration	  has	  given	  the	  nation	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  purpose,	  urgency	  and	  hope.	  With	  forthrightness,	  President	  Kennedy	  has	  faced	  the	  unpleasant	  fact	  of	  recession	  and	  stagnation	  bequeathed	  by	  the	  last	  Administration.”36	  	  By	  1962,	  however,	  concerns	  about	  slow	  growth	  resurfaced.	  Vigorous	  economic	  expansion	  of	  the	  sort	  envisioned	  by	  Keyserling	  remained	  elusive.	  Despite	  the	  military	  buildup,	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  S.	  McNamara	  concurrently	  sought	  to	  rein	  in	  defense	  spending,	  and	  the	  president	  seemed	  timid	  about	  massive	  spending	  increases.	  Seeking	  to	  prod	  Kennedy,	  Keyserling	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  called	  for	  a	  program	  of	  public	  works	  projects	  and	  a	  reorientation	  of	  the	  federal	  budget	  to	  clearly	  differentiate	  government	  expenses	  from	  government	  investments.37	  Labor	  advocated	  separating	  such	  government	  investments	  into	  a	  “Federal	  Capital	  Budget,”	  reflecting	  the	  amount	  of	  government	  spending	  devoted	  to	  creating	  a	  full-­‐employment	  economy.	  Keyserling	  clearly	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  means	  to	  further	  institutionalize	  the	  Employment	  Act	  of	  1946.38	  The	  AFL-­‐CIO	  also	  called	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  thirty-­‐five-­‐hour	  work	  week,	  an	  aggressive	  program	  of	  public	  works,	  and	  a	  short-­‐term	  tax	  cut.	  But	  of	  all	  these	  programs,	  Kennedy’s	  economists	  
pushed	  only	  the	  tax	  cut.39	  By	  1963,	  American	  labor	  was	  no	  longer	  hiding	  its	  frustration.	  AFL-­‐CIO	  News	  columnist	  Edward	  P.	  Morgan	  lamented,	  “Kennedy,	  like	  Ike,	  hasn’t	  yet	  got	  the	  U.S.	  moving	  again.”40	  UAW	  economist	  Nate	  Weinberg	  warned	  Walter	  Reuther	  that	  a	  full-­‐employment	  economy	  was	  becoming	  less	  and	  less	  likely	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  an	  inadequate	  tax	  program,	  an	  increasingly	  restrictive	  monetary	  supply,	  and	  stagnant	  federal	  expenditures.41	  On	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  escalation,	  then,	  organized	  labor	  was	  searching	  for	  programs	  and	  policies	  to	  revive	  full-­‐employment	  economics	  and	  address	  the	  threat	  of	  stagnation	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  	  Assuming	  the	  presidency	  after	  Kennedy’s	  shocking	  death,	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  sensed	  political	  opportunity	  in	  reviving	  the	  full-­‐employment	  agenda,	  perhaps	  in	  hope	  of	  developing	  a	  constituency	  independent	  of	  that	  of	  the	  late	  President	  Kennedy.	  Aggressively	  courting	  both	  Keyserling	  and	  trade	  union	  leaders,	  the	  Texan	  established	  in	  only	  a	  few	  short	  weeks	  a	  relationship	  of	  unprecedented	  warmth	  and	  trust.	  It	  was	  not	  merely	  Johnson’s	  legendary	  powers	  of	  persuasion	  that	  attracted	  labor—the	  new	  president	  miraculously	  pressed	  through	  Congress	  numerous	  items	  long	  on	  labor’s	  wish	  list,	  including	  Medicare,	  Medicaid,	  civil	  rights	  provisions,	  and	  a	  series	  of	  programs	  designed	  to	  address	  poverty.42	  In	  his	  first	  meeting	  as	  president	  with	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Executive	  Council,	  LBJ	  delighted	  labor	  leaders	  by	  proclaiming	  a	  goal	  of	  creating	  75	  million	  new	  jobs.43	  Johnson	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  first	  president	  since	  Truman	  willing	  to	  spend	  freely	  and	  aggressively,	  and,	  unlike	  Truman,	  Johnson	  had	  the	  legislative	  skills	  to	  get	  his	  programs	  passed.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  president	  seemed	  to	  be	  responding	  to	  Keyserling’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  state	  had	  within	  its	  resources	  all	  it	  needed	  to	  address	  social	  problems,	  vigorously	  expand	  the	  economy,	  and	  meet	  all	  of	  its	  international	  commitments.44	  The	  promise	  of	  Johnson’s	  War	  on	  Poverty—which	  Keyserling	  insisted	  “should	  be	  viewed	  not	  as	  a	  somber	  obligation	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  shining	  opportunity”—thrilled	  laborites	  after	  the	  inertia	  of	  the	  1950s.45	  Keyserling	  did	  worry	  somewhat	  that	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  focused	  excessively	  on	  the	  cultural	  roots	  of	  poverty	  rather	  than	  recognizing	  “the	  entire	  reason	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  poverty	  .	  .	  .	  was	  low	  economic	  performance.”46	  Nevertheless,	  a	  new	  spirit	  of	  hope	  pervaded	  labor	  in	  1964,	  as	  cherished	  programs	  and	  policies	  advocated	  for	  decades	  by	  Keyserling	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  came	  within	  the	  range	  of	  the	  possible.	  	  Of	  course,	  Johnson’s	  kinetic	  approach	  to	  domestic	  policy	  was	  matched	  by	  a	  willingness	  to	  test	  U.S.	  power	  overseas—in	  particular	  in	  Vietnam.	  Both	  Keyserling	  and	  U.S.	  labor	  vigorously	  supported	  American	  intervention	  in	  Vietnam.	  While	  labor’s	  longstanding	  anticommunist	  ideology	  served	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  support	  for	  intervention,	  clearly	  Keyserling’s	  guns-­‐and-­‐butter	  credo	  bequeathed	  a	  high	  level	  of	  comfort	  with	  the	  economics	  of	  war	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.47	  	  	  From	  the	  hour	  the	  first	  marines	  waded	  ashore	  in	  Vietnam,	  labor	  insisted	  that	  no	  necessary	  trade-­‐off	  need	  exist	  between	  military	  and	  domestic	  spending—and	  certainly	  the	  war	  warranted	  no	  necessary	  tax	  increase,	  either	  to	  balance	  the	  budget	  or	  quell	  the	  threat	  of	  inflation.	  Reflecting	  Keyserling’s	  growth-­‐focused	  economic	  
views,	  labor	  vigorously	  lobbied	  the	  White	  House	  against	  any	  cuts	  in	  domestic	  spending	  or	  any	  effort	  to	  raise	  taxes.	  In	  the	  early	  months	  of	  the	  war,	  AFL-­‐CIO	  legislative	  director	  Andrew	  Biemiller	  met	  with	  White	  House	  aide	  Joseph	  Califano	  to	  express	  the	  federation’s	  fears	  that	  Great	  Society	  programs	  might	  be	  “gutted”	  due	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  war.	  Califano	  assured	  Biemiller	  there	  would	  be	  no	  major	  cuts.48	  The	  next	  year,	  Keyserling,	  insisting	  that	  the	  growing	  inflation	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  too	  slowly,	  rather	  than	  too	  rapidly,	  growing	  economy,	  warned	  the	  White	  House	  against	  any	  tax	  hike.49	  George	  Meany,	  in	  meetings	  with	  White	  House	  staffers,	  also	  made	  clear	  his	  “lack	  of	  enthusiastic	  support	  for	  a	  tax	  increase.”50	  He	  reiterated	  labor’s	  views	  in	  a	  July	  1967	  letter	  to	  President	  Johnson,	  assailing	  “the	  false	  cry	  of	  guns	  or	  butter	  raised	  from	  opposite	  ends	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.”51	  Later	  that	  year,	  twenty	  economists	  working	  for	  AFL-­‐CIO	  unions	  met	  with	  the	  Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisors	  and	  sternly	  warned	  that	  any	  tax	  hike	  would	  hurt	  working	  people.52	  In	  lieu	  of	  tax	  hikes,	  Keyserling	  prescribed	  fiscal	  spending	  and	  lower	  interest	  rates.	  He	  continued	  to	  bemoan	  the	  “drive	  against	  inflation,”	  which	  he	  argued	  stifled	  growth,	  “inflated	  the	  fat	  and	  starved	  the	  lean.”53	  	  Johnson	  sided	  with	  labor’s	  guns-­‐and-­‐butter	  approach	  through	  most	  of	  his	  presidency.	  In	  his	  1966	  annual	  budget	  message	  to	  Congress,	  the	  president	  assessed	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  war:	  “The	  true	  costs	  of	  this	  conflict	  are	  death,	  pain	  and	  grief.	  .	  .	  .	  But	  the	  economic	  costs	  of	  Vietnam	  impose	  no	  unbearable	  burden	  on	  our	  resources.”54	  Yet	  in	  private,	  the	  White	  House	  was	  not	  so	  sanguine.	  Joseph	  Califano	  warned,	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1966,	  that	  if	  the	  current	  high	  levels	  of	  employment	  were	  to	  be	  maintained,	  the	  result	  would	  be	  an	  inflation	  that	  would	  not	  be	  “tolerated	  domestically.”	  But	  with	  unions	  demanding	  wage	  increases	  and	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  unwilling	  to	  challenge	  labor,	  Califano	  lamented,	  “[m]aybe	  things	  have	  to	  get	  worse	  before	  they	  get	  better.”55	  	  As	  inflation	  rose	  during	  1966,	  pressure	  mounted	  on	  Johnson	  to	  propose	  a	  tax	  increase.	  It	  was,	  however,	  not	  until	  late	  summer	  1967	  that	  he	  offered	  a	  concrete	  plan	  to	  raise	  taxes.	  Congress	  then	  took	  almost	  another	  year	  to	  grant	  the	  tax	  hike.56	  Historian	  Robert	  Collins	  blames	  Johnson’s	  “long	  inaction	  on	  the	  tax	  front”	  for	  allowing	  “the	  inflationary	  spiral	  to	  take	  hold.”57	  Johnson	  aide	  Bill	  Moyers	  labeled	  the	  delay	  “the	  single	  most	  devastating	  decision	  in	  the	  Johnson	  administration.”58	  Keyserling	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  with	  their	  intense	  lobbying	  campaign	  on	  behalf	  of	  guns-­‐and-­‐butter,	  clearly	  contributed	  to	  the	  president’s	  reluctance	  to	  raise	  taxes.	  Johnson,	  loath	  to	  alienate	  one	  of	  the	  few	  liberal	  constituencies	  strongly	  supporting	  his	  Vietnam	  policy,	  clearly	  was	  hesitant	  to	  imperil	  relations	  with	  organized	  labor.	  	  While	  organized	  labor	  remained	  steadfast	  in	  Keyserling’s	  economic	  grip,	  the	  quality-­‐verses-­‐quantity	  debate	  among	  liberals	  resurfaced	  bitterly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  The	  liberal	  advocacy	  group	  Americans	  for	  Democratic	  Action	  (ADA),	  in	  which	  John	  Kenneth	  Galbraith	  served	  as	  the	  chairman	  and	  Keyserling	  as	  vice-­‐chairman,	  provided	  the	  venue	  for	  much	  of	  the	  debate.	  While	  Keyserling	  
remained	  a	  spirited	  defender	  of	  the	  president	  and	  guns-­‐and-­‐butter	  economics,	  Galbraith	  and	  others	  grew	  increasingly	  critical.	  By	  late	  1967,	  the	  critics	  were	  actively	  searching	  for	  an	  antiwar	  liberal	  to	  challenge	  President	  Johnson.	  In	  early	  1968,	  the	  anti-­‐Johnson	  forces	  gained	  the	  upper	  hand	  and	  engineered	  an	  endorsement	  of	  Senator	  Eugene	  McCarthy,	  a	  dove	  and	  a	  fiscal	  moderate.	  ADA	  World,	  the	  organization’s	  mouthpiece,	  then	  refused	  to	  print	  Keyserling’s	  defense	  of	  the	  president.	  Led	  by	  Keyserling,	  one	  by	  one,	  trade	  unionists	  resigned	  from	  the	  ADA.59	  	  Increasingly,	  peace-­‐minded	  liberals	  focused	  attacks	  on	  the	  war’s	  economic	  impact,	  assailing	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  Keyserling	  economics—that	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  would	  thrive	  on	  a	  guns-­‐and-­‐butter	  diet.	  Under	  increasing	  fire,	  Keyserling	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  invested	  tremendous	  energy	  and	  resources	  in	  Hubert	  Humphrey’s	  presidential	  campaign,	  but	  in	  the	  end,	  their	  efforts	  were	  for	  naught.	  Despite	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  Keyserling	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  Republican	  Richard	  Nixon,	  a	  candidate	  with	  no	  deep	  devotion	  to	  full-­‐employment	  economics,	  defeated	  Humphrey.	  	  For	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  labor	  and	  the	  new	  president	  maintained	  an	  uneasy	  truce—expedited	  by	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO’s	  appreciation	  of	  Nixon’s	  handling	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam.	  By	  1971,	  however,	  the	  economy	  began	  showing	  signs	  of	  weakness;	  unemployment	  soared	  and	  inflation	  edged	  upwards.	  But	  full-­‐employment	  sympathizers	  were	  in	  short	  supply	  in	  Nixon’s	  administration,	  and	  high	  union	  wages,	  especially	  in	  the	  construction	  industry	  (spurred	  by	  Vietnam-­‐related	  spending),	  provided	  a	  convenient	  scapegoat.	  “Our	  problems	  come	  because	  of	  the	  high	  wages	  demanded	  by	  the	  workers	  of	  this	  country,”	  bluntly	  complained	  White	  House	  economic	  advisor	  Arthur	  Burns.60	  CEA	  chairman	  Paul	  McCracken	  likewise	  claimed	  “the	  construction	  industry	  continues	  to	  cause	  us	  extremely	  serious	  problems	  in	  our	  attempts	  to	  reduce	  inflation.	  Wage	  increases	  appear	  to	  be	  accelerating	  instead	  of	  subsiding.”61	  	  Keyserling	  and	  organized	  labor	  responded	  with	  calls	  for	  a	  return	  to	  fullemployment	  policies,	  and	  blamed	  the	  emerging	  recession	  on	  complications	  related	  to	  de-­‐escalating	  the	  war.	  Meany	  summed	  up	  labor’s	  position	  in	  his	  goals	  for	  1971:	  “The	  only	  game	  plan	  for	  America	  is	  full	  employment.”62	  Denying	  any	  necessary	  “trade-­‐off”	  between	  employment	  and	  inflation,	  Keyserling	  introduced	  what	  he	  called	  the	  “Freedom	  Budget,”	  a	  full-­‐employment-­‐based	  plan	  for	  massive	  government	  investment	  in	  the	  economy.63	  But	  few	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  paid	  attention.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  discourse	  had	  changed.	  Rachelle	  Horowitz,	  who	  worked	  with	  Keyserling,	  recalled	  the	  Freedom	  Budget	  “was	  opposed	  by	  two	  groups:	  fiscal	  conservatives	  and,	  sadly,	  peaceniks	  in	  the	  anti-­‐	  Vietnam	  War	  movement	  who	  argued	  that	  you	  couldn’t	  have	  both	  guns	  and	  butter.”64	  	  Although	  fiscally	  conservative	  monetarists	  occupied	  key	  positions	  in	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  Nixon’s	  policies	  veered	  widely.	  Finally,	  in	  1971	  the	  president	  announced	  price	  and	  wage	  controls.	  Keyserling	  was	  as	  shocked	  and	  dismayed	  as	  
the	  monetarists.	  “They	  have	  substituted	  the	  damaging	  philosophy	  of	  scarcity	  for	  the	  rewarding	  philosophy	  of	  abundance,”	  pronounced	  Keyserling	  on	  the	  Nixon	  plan.65	  Excessive	  demand,	  insisted	  Keyserling,	  hardly	  lay	  at	  the	  root	  of	  rising	  inflation;	  instead,	  he	  related	  inflation	  to	  high	  interest	  rates	  and	  soaring	  production	  costs,	  which	  stemmed	  partly	  from	  the	  winding	  down	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.66	  Assailing	  what	  he	  labeled	  the	  new	  “scarcity”	  economics,	  Keyserling	  also	  warned	  against	  cuts	  to	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex.	  The	  “scarcity	  school	  has	  led	  the	  nation	  and	  citizen	  astray,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  entire	  matter	  of	  national	  defense.	  They	  have	  done	  this	  by	  asserting	  that	  our	  national	  defense	  outlays	  have	  imposed	  an	  excessive	  and	  undesirable	  burden	  upon	  the	  economy.”	  No	  such	  burden	  existed,	  Keyserling	  insisted,	  and	  with	  “the	  intent	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  gain	  effective	  control	  of	  the	  oil	  supply	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  .	  .	  .	  we	  should	  keep	  our	  guard	  high.”67	  Guns	  and	  butter	  remained	  Keyserling’s	  philosophy	  to	  the	  end.	  “The	  widespread	  belief	  that	  the	  Federal	  Budget	  can	  adequately	  serve	  the	  great	  domestic	  priorities	  dependent	  upon	  it,	  only	  by	  corresponding	  slashes	  in	  defense	  spending	  has	  no	  justification,”	  Keyserling	  continued	  to	  insist	  in	  1975.68	  	  While	  Keyserling	  and	  George	  Meany	  distinguished	  themselves	  as	  particularly	  vehement	  critics	  of	  Nixon’s	  economic	  policies,	  landing	  Meany	  on	  the	  cover	  of	  Life	  magazine,	  few	  paid	  attention	  to	  their	  full-­‐employment	  prescriptions.	  Keyserling	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  spent	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  decade	  pursuing	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Humphrey-­‐Hawkins	  Act,	  which	  actually	  became	  law	  in	  1978,	  but,	  as	  Keyserling	  complained,	  quickly	  was	  “ignored	  flagrantly	  and	  almost	  in	  its	  entirety.”69	  	  As	  full-­‐employment	  economics	  fell	  from	  grace,	  so	  too	  did	  organized	  labor.	  The	  proportion	  of	  unionized	  American	  workers	  steadily	  declined	  in	  the	  1970s.	  The	  AFL-­‐CIO’s	  political	  clout	  suffered	  a	  parallel	  decline.	  Increasingly	  both	  laborites	  and	  advocates	  of	  full-­‐employment	  economics	  found	  themselves	  left	  out	  of	  the	  political	  discourse,	  a	  discourse	  that,	  particularly	  on	  the	  liberal	  side,	  rejected	  defense	  spending	  and	  bemoaned	  the	  overconfidence	  of	  experts	  who	  led	  the	  country	  into	  the	  Vietnam	  fiasco.	  Full-­‐employment	  economics’	  harnessing	  of	  Cold	  War	  rhetoric,	  while	  bringing	  immediate	  gains,	  contributed	  to	  its	  later	  collapse—a	  fall	  that	  paralleled	  the	  larger	  decline	  of	  organized	  labor	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  By	  the	  1970s,	  then,	  Keyserling’s	  ebullient	  economic	  vision	  lay	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  From	  the	  late	  1940s,	  the	  growth-­‐obsessed	  economist	  had	  turned	  repeatedly	  and	  unapologetically	  to	  defense	  spending	  to	  provide	  ammunition	  for	  full-­‐employment	  economics.	  Supported	  by	  organized	  labor,	  his	  political	  base,	  Keyserling	  helped	  create	  an	  atmosphere	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  open	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  guns-­‐and-­‐butter	  policies	  pursued	  by	  Lyndon	  Johnson—even	  helping	  to	  lock	  the	  president	  into	  those	  policies.	  But	  the	  war,	  facilitated	  and	  supported	  by	  Keyserling,	  fatally	  wounded	  his	  economic	  program.	  Ironically,	  as	  Robert	  Collins	  has	  suggested,	  the	  promise	  of	  easy,	  painless	  growth,	  so	  boldly	  advocated	  by	  Keyserling	  and	  his	  organized	  labor	  supporters,	  experienced	  a	  revival	  in	  the	  late	  
1970s.	  The	  so-­‐called	  “supply-­‐side	  school”	  of	  the	  conservative	  movement,	  rejecting	  the	  grim	  sacrifices	  proffered	  by	  the	  monetarists	  and	  many	  liberals,	  put	  forth	  a	  program	  similar	  at	  least	  in	  spirit	  to	  Keyserling’s—growth	  and	  fiscal	  health	  through	  tax	  cuts	  and	  heavy	  defense	  spending.70	  Ronald	  Reagan	  liked	  to	  surprise	  liberals	  by	  professing	  his	  admiration	  for	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt,	  and	  to	  many	  observers	  the	  Californian	  seemed	  to	  embody	  at	  least	  aspects	  of	  FDR’s	  contagious	  self-­‐confidence.	  In	  his	  economic	  policies,	  particularly	  his	  devotion	  to	  strong	  defense,	  faith	  in	  painless	  growth,	  and	  optimistic	  rhetoric,	  Reagan	  also	  seemed	  to	  embody	  the	  buoyant	  outlook	  of	  another	  New	  Dealer—Leon	  Keyserling.	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